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STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES E. BALLENBERGER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17619 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as stated by respondent failed to 
include certain uncontroverted facts of paramount importance. 
Upon Officer Hansen's arrival at the Oakwood Shopping 
Center, the uncontroverted testimony reveals that Mr. Ballenberger 
was asked to leave his car and was then handcuffed by Officer 
Hansen (Tr. 54, 55). At that point Officer Hansen shined his 
light under the seat (Tr. 54). Officer Hansen then took Mr. 
Ballenberger to his car and stated that he was under arrest for 
possession of stolen property (Tr. 55). Officer Hansen then read 
t!r. Fulton his Miranda rights (Tr. 38). At this time no theft had 
been reported, nor was there any indication that the property 
located in the back seat of the car was even stolen. 
According to Officer LeVitre Mr. Ballenberger's vehicle 
was first observed at about 3:10 A.M. (Tr. 8). Hr. Ballenberger 
11as read his rights at approximately 3:19 A.M. (Tr. 134). Mr. 
Ballenberger was subsequently questioned and required to stay with 
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Officer Hansen while Mr. Fulton traveled with Officer LeVitrl 
five blocks away to awaken Hr. Ashby, question him and retur-
the Oakwood Shopping Center (Tr. 131-134). At that time 
approximately 3:40 A.M., some twenty minutes after Mr. 
Ballenberger was read his Miranda rights, he and Mr. Fulton, 
formally placed under arrest (Tr. 134). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. BALLENBERGER' S ARREST WAS WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE. 
A. Probable cause existed only after it was estabEj 
that a crime had been committed. 
What constitutes probable cause for a warrantless ar:, 
is stated in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). In Beck the 
defendants sought to suppress evidence of clearing house slirl 
allegedly obtained by an unlawful search following a warrant:: 
arrest. The United States Supreme Court defined what consti:I 
probable cause and stated: 
~fuether the arrest was constitutionally valid 
depends in turn on whether at the moment the 
arrest was made, the officers had probable cause 
to make it--whether the moment the facts and 
circumstances within their knowledge and of which 
they had reasonably trustworthy informatioi; w~re 
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 
that the petitioner had committed or was 
committing an offense. Id. at 91. 
This court has explicitly adopted the Beck standard:'' 
case of State v. \'Jhittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (1980), where the: 
stated: 
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·I 
. . . we first address the question of what 
constitutes probable cause for arrest without a 
warrant. The basic standard was set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 
later stated by this court as follows: The 
determination should be made on an objective 
standard: whether from the facts known to the 
officer, and the inferences which fairly might be 
drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person 
in his position would be justified in believing 
that a suspect had committed the offense. Id. at 
106. -
Probable cause existed in this case only after it was 
established that a crime had been committed. Prior to the time 
that Mr. Ashby identified the property in the back of Mr. 
Ballenberger's car, there was no indication that a theft had 
occurred. The lateness of the hour and the fact that Hr. 
Ballenberger had property in the back of his car, which was not 
satisfactorily explained to the officer, did not provide the 
officer with probable cause. There simply was no reasonable 
justification at that time to believe that Mr. Ballenberger had 
committed or was committing a criminal offense. Only after Mr. 
Ashby identified the objects in the back of Mr. Ballenberger' s car 
as his own did the officers have probable cause to make an arrest. 
The detention prior thereto constituted an illegal arrest, 
especially in light of the fact that Hansen had handcuffed Hr. 
Ballenberger and placed him in his patrol car. 
The State contends that because Mr. Ballenberger did not 
ask to leave he cannot claim that he was detained. Such a 
contention, however, has no basis in law and has never been a 
position adopted by this court. The case law suggests that once a 
person has been detained oore than momentarily or briefly, the 
- 3 -
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restraint must be viewed as an arrest. Rio v. United Stat,, 
U.S. 253 (1960); Tcrrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). It is 
irrrrnaterial that he asks to leave if indeed he is detained j 
the color of legal authority. In fact, the mere calling by 
officer in the form of a command to stand still or to come, 
or any other expression indicating that a person is not frnl 
as he pleases is sufficient to constitute an arrest. See~. 
v. United States, 298 F.2d 310(C.A. D.C. 1961). 
The fact that probable cause was later established i·j 
case does not legally justify the initial arrest. Heither, 1 
act of forcing Mr. Ballenberger into the patrol car after bE. 
handcuffed constitute a voluntary act on his part sufficien: 
legally justify the officers in questioning Mr. Ballenberge: 
before an arrest is made. Under the circumstances of this c: 
at the moment Mr. Ballenberger was forced into the patrol co:' 
was placed under arrest. It was at that point that probablE l 
for such an arrest did not exist. 
B. The initial questioning of appellant was inpermS; 
under Utah law. 
Respondent contends that the initial questioning of 
appellant was permissible since the officers had an "object> 
credible reason" for stopping Hr. Ballenberger. However, su; 
standard is not the law in Utah and is contrary to provisior.; 
contained in the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 
U.C.A. (1953), as amended, specifically outlines the grounds 
required for an officer to stop and question a suspect. 
- 4 -
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A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
According to the foregoing, a police officer must have a 
reasonable suspicion, not an objective credible reason, to believe 
that the suspect has committed or is in the act of committing an 
offense in order to justify a stop. In People v. LaPene, 40 
N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562 (1976), upon which the State relies, 
the court indicates that the requirement of an objective credible 
reason is less stringent than that of a reasonable suspicion 
required by Utah law. According to the rationale of that court 
the reasonable suspicion standard requires a belief that crirainal 
activity has occurred or is about to occur, while the requirement 
of an objective credible reason does not require any founded 
suspicion of criminal activity. This court has never adopted the 
objective credible reason standard and only makes reference to the 
lesser standard in dicta in Whittenback, supra. Thus, since the 
standard argued by the State is not the law in Utah, there is no 
validity to its argument that the initial stop of Mr. Ballenberger 
was legally justified. 
In Re Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 1978), which is quoted 
in appellant's first brief in length, the court stated the 
circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include 
specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect some 
criminal activity relating to the crime has taken place and the 
person he intends to stop is involved in that activity. The court 
- 5 -
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stated that the officer must be able to articulate a reasor 
suspicion and that mere curiosity, or rumor, or a hunch is r 
sufficient. See also State v. Thompson, 613 P.2d 525 (Wash 
1980). 
The officers' action in stopping Hr. Ballenberger ar. 
questioning him as to identification and as to the property ·I 
back seat was beyond the scope of a permissible stop. At tr:j 
the stop was made, there was no reasonable suspicion that Mr 
Ballenberger was engaged in any criminal activity. Neither 
there any indication that Mr. Ballenberger had violated any 
traffic ordinance. He was merely in a public place where he~ 
I 
legitimate right to be. Under these circumstances the polic: 
officers could not have developed a reasonable suspicion. i 
The fact that Mr. Ballenberger was already stoppedi:I 
I 
well lighted area in the Oakwood Shopping Center does not me"i 
that the police could not "stop" him. A suspect is not requ::j 
to be fleeing or to be in motion in order for an officer to I 
effectuate a stop. The mere show of authority or the restrn:: 
liberty of a citizen is sufficient. See Terry, note 16. The:! 
that Mr. Ballenberger had to stop what he was doing to respond 
officers' questions constituted a stop. And certainly at the. 
point the officer forced Hr. Ballenberger into his car and r( 
him his Miranda rights, Mr. Ballenberger' s liberty had been 
restrained. 
officers had 
At either juncture, a stop occurred well before :
1 
any indication that the back seat property had b;,' 
nablY stolen, or that the activity of Hr. Ballenger was reaso · 
- 6 -
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criminally suspicious to justify an investigative stop under 
Section 77-7-15. 
CONCLUSION 
Hr. Ballenberger's arrest and stop were made without 
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in 
criminal conduct. Accordingly, for reasons stated above, it is 
clear that the lower court erred in failing to suppress evidence 
admitted at trial. The conviction of the trial court should be 
reversed and a new trial ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
By.......,.Fm'i....,.,~~rrf-""""'~~~~~~ RA 
Attorne s for Defendant-
Appellant 
500 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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